Engineer / Platform / Services
Making sure your AI only touches what it should
Every agent's access mapped and held to what it needs, every action logged where the agent cannot alter it, and every safeguard tested rather than trusted.
Wrote 1,000 RBAC rules to secure Linux servers
Enhanced data security by implementing 1,000 RBAC rules for developers, application instances, PostgreSQL, MS SQL, and other Linux servers, preventing unauthorized access; documented with Ansible automation.
Implemented a recorded 1,000 RBAC rules across developer, application, database and Linux access, with documented Ansible configuration.
Led access management across M365 and SSO
Prevented security breaches by leading access management initiatives, utilizing M365, 1Password, Red Hat SSO, and OKTA SSO.
Led access management with M365, 1Password, Red Hat SSO and OKTA, sharply cutting unauthorised-access risk and making access auditable.
Built fail‑closed rate limiting and anti‑abuse
Built fail‑closed abuse controls — 22 Redis‑backed rate limiters, Cloudflare Turnstile, request idempotency and an origin lock — so the platform sheds bots and floods instead of trusting its callers.
Built fail-closed abuse controls: 22 Redis-backed rate limiters, Cloudflare Turnstile, request idempotency and an origin lock on the front door.
Ran a continuous security scanning programme
Established a continuous security programme — code scanning, DAST, dependency and vulnerability checks, SBOM generation, secret scanning and SHA‑pinned actions — alongside 21 written security audits.
Established a continuous security programme — code scanning, DAST, dependency checks, SBOM, secret scanning and pinned actions — plus 21 audits.
Three locks on the door, none of them locked
Found and closed three SSH brute‑force protections that had never worked: a ban jail watching port 22 while the daemon listened on 1986, a rate limit shadowed by a broader rule above it, and a ban action whose binary never resolved, so no ban had ever applied.
Three protections that had never once fired now do, and the class of defect they belong to — a control whose failure mode is that it keeps reporting healthy —…
Proved the intrusion ban works every run
Proved the intrusion‑banning path end to end on every hardening run by banning a reserved test address, reading the resulting kernel rule and unbanning in a guaranteed cleanup block, so a jail that stops working fails a run instead of reporting healthy.
A banning path that stops working now fails a converge instead of continuing to report healthy, which is the only property that mattered.
Added a one‑second preflight for secrets
Added a preflight play that runs the same code as the converge against operator‑local secrets in about a second, after a half‑applied production run died on its ninth task with the swap settings already written to the live host.
A secret that does not resolve now costs a two-second refusal on a laptop instead of a partly-applied change to a live server.
Wrote a scope rule after a credential leak
Wrote a scope rule into the repository after a restructure carried another company's inventory, firewall allowances and prose into it — and kept the quarantined residue under the secret scanner rather than excluding it.
The scope boundary is a written rule with a stated test, the residue is visible rather than buried, and the specific shape of credential that got through now…
Split every operational secret per host
Split the four per‑host operational secrets after establishing that two hosts sharing one dead‑man's switch alert less than two switches, not more, and that a shared backup passphrase can expose both hosts' backups, even in separate repositories, if someone obtains it and can read both repositories' encrypted data and key files.
Secrets are per host by construction, and the two failure modes that would have followed from sharing them are written down where the next person edits the…