Engineer / Platform / Services
Deciding who can reach what
Accounts, passwords and permissions arranged so people hold exactly the access their job needs, and leavers lose it that day.
Wrote 1,000 RBAC rules to secure Linux servers
Enhanced data security by implementing 1,000 RBAC rules for developers, application instances, PostgreSQL, MS SQL, and other Linux servers, preventing unauthorized access; documented with Ansible automation.
Implemented a recorded 1,000 RBAC rules across developer, application, database and Linux access, with documented Ansible configuration.
Led access management across M365 and SSO
Prevented security breaches by leading access management initiatives, utilizing M365, 1Password, Red Hat SSO, and OKTA SSO.
Led access management with M365, 1Password, Red Hat SSO and OKTA, sharply cutting unauthorised-access risk and making access auditable.
Managed 8 WireGuard and IPsec VPN connections
Managed and troubleshot 8 WireGuard VPN and IPsec VPN connections, ensuring secure communication across Google Cloud and Linux systems.
Managed and troubleshot 8 WireGuard and IPsec VPN connections across Google Cloud and Linux, ending recurring connectivity outages.
Improved team communication and collaboration
Improved team communication and collaboration by implementing Slack, Mattermost, 1Password, and Jira, saving 8,000 hours of labor.
Saved ~8,000 hours by rolling out Slack, Mattermost, 1Password and Jira, turning chased information and redone work into real delivery.
Administered network infrastructure
Administered network infrastructure for over 1,000 servers, ensuring optimal system deployment, security, and troubleshooting.
Administered network infrastructure for 1,000+ servers, ensuring reliable deployment, solid security and prompt troubleshooting.
Automated SSL/TLS certs for 100 Docker apps
Automated SSL/TLS certificate creation for 100 Docker applications, ensuring secure connections across Ubuntu Linux hosts.
Automated SSL/TLS certificates for 100 Docker apps on Ubuntu Linux, ending manual renewals and the outages expired certs cause.
Built organization context switching for users
Designed an organization context‑switching system with client localStorage and server‑side cookie mirroring, letting users act as managed organizations while enforcing least‑privilege authorization.
Built organization context-switching with localStorage and server cookie mirroring, letting users act as managed orgs under least-privilege auth.
Built email with failover and delivery logging
Built email as a platform capability — three providers with failover, delivery webhooks, send and delivery logging, templating and campaigns — behind a startup check that will not boot without one.
Built email as a platform capability: three providers with failover, delivery webhooks, send and delivery logging, templating and campaign broadcasts.
Provisioned Azure infrastructure as code
Provisioned Azure infrastructure as code with Bicep — Container Apps, PostgreSQL Flexible Server, Front Door/WAF and networking — across the development, staging and production environments.
Provisioned Azure infrastructure as code with Bicep — Container Apps, PostgreSQL, Front Door/WAF — reproducible across dev, staging and prod.
Hardened the application with nonce‑ CSP
Hardened the application with nonce‑based CSP, HSTS, SameSite cookies, least‑privilege database roles and server‑side entitlement re‑checks.
Hardened the app with nonce-based CSP, HSTS, SameSite cookies, least-privilege database roles and server-side entitlement re-checks.
Automated team collaboration
Automated team collaboration, password management, task and time management, and built a semi‑automatic project‑showcase system, raising team productivity.
Automated collaboration, password, task and time management and built a semi-automatic project-showcase system, raising team productivity.
Integrated a company‑wide password manager
Integrated a company‑wide password‑management system, strengthening security and streamlining access control.
Integrated a company-wide password-management system, strengthening security and streamlining access control across the organisation.
Built Stripe and in‑app purchase entitlements
Built the payments and entitlements layer — Stripe alongside Apple and Google in‑app purchase — gating the directory, search and export through an 11‑table access model checked on the server.
Built the payments and entitlements layer — Stripe with Apple and Google in-app purchase — gating directory, search and export from an access model.
Built fail‑closed rate limiting and anti‑abuse
Built fail‑closed abuse controls — 22 Redis‑backed rate limiters, Cloudflare Turnstile, request idempotency and an origin lock — so the platform sheds bots and floods instead of trusting its callers.
Built fail-closed abuse controls: 22 Redis-backed rate limiters, Cloudflare Turnstile, request idempotency and an origin lock on the front door.
Built company ownership claims and adjudication
Built company ownership claims end to end — a user claims a company, an administrator adjudicates, and an approval rewrites the authorization graph that decides who is allowed to edit what.
Built company ownership claims end to end: a user claims, an administrator adjudicates, and approval rewrites the authorization graph.
Ran a continuous security scanning programme
Established a continuous security programme — code scanning, DAST, dependency and vulnerability checks, SBOM generation, secret scanning and SHA‑pinned actions — alongside 21 written security audits.
Established a continuous security programme — code scanning, DAST, dependency checks, SBOM, secret scanning and pinned actions — plus 21 audits.
Three locks on the door, none of them locked
Found and closed three SSH brute‑force protections that had never worked: a ban jail watching port 22 while the daemon listened on 1986, a rate limit shadowed by a broader rule above it, and a ban action whose binary never resolved, so no ban had ever applied.
Three protections that had never once fired now do, and the class of defect they belong to — a control whose failure mode is that it keeps reporting healthy —…
Hardened SSH to 24 validated directives
Hardened SSH to 24 asserted directives with three‑stage validation — the candidate file, the assembled config, then the daemon's own read‑back — after the read‑back caught the running server silently overriding two of the twenty‑four.
The SSH posture is now the daemon's answer rather than the repository's claim, and the difference is not theoretical — it was already two settings wide when…
Proved the intrusion ban works every run
Proved the intrusion‑banning path end to end on every hardening run by banning a reserved test address, reading the resulting kernel rule and unbanning in a guaranteed cleanup block, so a jail that stops working fails a run instead of reporting healthy.
A banning path that stops working now fails a converge instead of continuing to report healthy, which is the only property that mattered.
Verified firewall rules by position
Verified firewall rules by position rather than presence, reading the numbered rule list and the live packet‑filter chain, because a rule that exists is not a rule any packet reaches.
The firewall posture is now checked the way a packet experiences it. The most useful outcome was not the check but what it revealed about the reporting that…
Added a one‑second preflight for secrets
Added a preflight play that runs the same code as the converge against operator‑local secrets in about a second, after a half‑applied production run died on its ninth task with the swap settings already written to the live host.
A secret that does not resolve now costs a two-second refusal on a laptop instead of a partly-applied change to a live server.
Reconciled a 20‑record DNS zone as code
Reconciled a 20‑record DNS zone declaratively against the Cloudflare API with separate audit and BIND‑export entry points, and turned the CDN proxy back off on privacy grounds after building it.
The zone is versioned, comparable and exportable, and the one decision that went against the obvious default is written down with its reasoning so that nobody…
Cut systemd sandbox exposure on every unit
Cut systemd sandbox exposure across every unit this platform installs — a dead‑man's‑switch service from 9.6 UNSAFE to 1.5, an internet‑facing git forge from 8.3 EXPOSED to 1.5 — and added a converge‑time parser check after finding a misspelled directive silently ignored in three unit templates.
Every unit runs with the privileges it needs and not the ones it does not, the numbers are measured rather than asserted, and the class of defect where a typo…
Ran containers on Podman and Quadlet
Deployed a container plane on Podman and Quadlet under systemd rather than Docker, because Docker's default bridge‑port publishing can bypass UFW rules — and gave deploys an unprivileged user with one fixed command instead of root.
Containers run under the supervisor that was already trusted, behind the firewall that was already declared, and a routine release uses one scoped command…
Provisioned a second server from code
Automated the provisioning of a second server on a second cloud provider, creating the firewall before the machine so it is born behind one, with both providers' firewalls written directly against their REST APIs to avoid a third‑party collection.
A second host can be created, or re-adopted, from the repository, behind a firewall that already exists, at a cost the file states.
Wrote a scope rule after a credential leak
Wrote a scope rule into the repository after a restructure carried another company's inventory, firewall allowances and prose into it — and kept the quarantined residue under the secret scanner rather than excluding it.
The scope boundary is a written rule with a stated test, the residue is visible rather than buried, and the specific shape of credential that got through now…
Split every operational secret per host
Split the four per‑host operational secrets after establishing that two hosts sharing one dead‑man's switch alert less than two switches, not more, and that a shared backup passphrase can expose both hosts' backups, even in separate repositories, if someone obtains it and can read both repositories' encrypted data and key files.
Secrets are per host by construction, and the two failure modes that would have followed from sharing them are written down where the next person edits the…
Reached the unused half of the core
Reached the half of the messaging core the application had never used — backup transfer, disappearing messages, message editing and resending, verified invitations, proxies and encryption policy — driving every test against the real library with no mocks.
The previously unreached half of the core is driven by tests against the real library, and the wrapper carries the highest floor in the project.
Know the licence of everything you ship
Audited 644 Rust crates for licence compatibility on every build, and proved the check fires by rewriting one crate's licence and by moving the pinned core revision without regenerating.
The distribution position is checked on every build, and the check is known to work because it was made to fail rather than because it has never spoken.
Measured 13 addresses with no tracking
Measured thirteen addresses from the web server's own access log alone — no cookie, no tracker and no third‑party service — masking the client network as each line is written, and folding the result into a permanent archive of 21 daily counts and 20 monthly facets.
Thirteen addresses are measured this way, and the site ships no cookie, no tracker and no third-party request, so there is nothing to consent to and nothing…
Published a readable Tor onion mirror
Published the site as a Tor onion mirror on a readable address beginning engineer, with the key generated off the host so it never reached this repository or a laptop, and left it the one front door of four that is never counted.
The site has four front doors onto one build, and this is the only one that is never counted. Gemini requests and Gopher connections are tallied per day with…